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THE COURT'S USE OF THE IMPLICIT
DIVESTITURE DOCTRINE TO IMPLEMENT ITS
IMPERFECT NOTION OF FEDERALISM IN INDIAN
COUNTRY

Alex Tallchief Skibine*
INTRODUCTION
With two hundred years worth of un-discarded baggage, and antiquated and
often contradictory theories, the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence in the
field of federal Indian law has mystified both academics and practitioners. None
of the Supreme Court's theories within the field of Federal Indian law have been
more puzzling than the implicit divestiture doctrine, and its use in determining
whether Indian tribes have inherent sovereign powers to regulate individuals who
are not members of the tribe. However, in its last decision on the subject, Strate v.
1
the Court held that a tribal court did not have judicial
A-1 Contractors,
jurisdiction to hear a tort case involving a traffic accident between two nonIndians on a highway running through the reservation but maintained by the state
pursuant to a right of way received from the federal government.2 After observing
that a tribe's inherent power does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government, the Court ended its analysis by stating in a rather
conclusory fashion, "neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state
the right of reservation Indians to make
highway at issue is needed to preserve
3
them.",
by
ruled
be
and
laws
own
their
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, tracing the evolution of the
implicit divestiture doctrine, it shows that the doctrine has been transformed from
one putting the burden on the tribes to show why having jurisdiction over
nonmembers is essential to tribal self-government to one adding on the tribes the
burden of also demonstrating why state jurisdiction over such nonmembers

* Professor of Law, University of Utah. J.D. 1976, Northwestern University. I would like to thank

professors Philip Frickey and Michael McConnell for agreeing to read previous drafts of this article
and making insightful comments. I am also grateful for the financial assistance provided by the
University of Utah College of Law's Faculty Development Fund.
1. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
2. The State received the right of way in 1970 pursuant to federal legislation enacted in 1948, ch.
45, 62 Stat. 17 (1970) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28 (1994)).
3. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting from Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959)).
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infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them. Secondly, this article shows that the purpose of this newly constructed
doctrine is to privilege the assertion of state jurisdiction at the expense of tribal
jurisdiction. Finally, the article criticizes the theoretical basis of the doctrine and
suggests that it is one born out of a judicial view which only sees the states as the
beneficiaries of federalism and refuses to include tribes in the federalism calculus.
While some scholars are offering ideas on how to go about "de-colonizing"
federal Indian law,4 or are blaming the Court's new direction on its abandonment
of "foundational principles," 5 others believe that the Court is implementing the
past congressional policy of colonialism by ignoring current congressional policies.
These critics are accusing the Court of assuming a legislative function without
legislative guidance.6 Other scholars attempt to justify the Court's decisions by
reference to overarching democratic principles.7 This article takes the position
that the Court's jurisprudence towards tribal power over non-members is mostly
driven by its desire to implement its own notion of federalism while being
consistent with its jurisprudence concerning the power of the judiciary to create
rules of federal common law. 8 Federalism here is used in the Jeffersonian sense.
This means that governmental power should not be exclusively concentrated in a
strong central (federal) government, but should be diffused to local governments,
such as the states. 9 Traditionally "federalism" means a devolution of power from
a central government. The Indian tribes as local governments, should be able to
benefit from such philosophy. 10 While the Congress has cooperated to some
extent with the notion of a tripartite federalism, and the corresponding devolution

4. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest:A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 ARKANSAS L. REV. 77 (1993); Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the
Hanodaganyasto Decolonize FederalIndian Control Law, 31 U. OF MIcH. J.L. REFORM. 899 (1998);

Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and

Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 WIS. L. REV. 219; Steven Paul McSloy,

Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21' Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 217 (1993).
5. See David H. Getches, Conqueringthe CulturalFrontier:The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L.REv. 1573 (1996); see also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present:Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.

381 (1993).
6. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The JudicialDivestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority Over Non-members, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999)(hereinafter Our Age of
Colonialism).
7. See L. Scott Gould, The ConsentParadigm:Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L.

REV. 809 (1996).

8. Other commentators have also recently argued that notions of federalism were behind

resolutions of some of the issues being disputed within Indian reservations See Kevin Worthen &

Wayne Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gaming? "A Few Pages of History are
Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU. L. REv. 407; see also Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars:
HaudenosauneeLands and Federalism,46 BuFF. L. REV. 1041 (1998).

9. The term also comprises those who, out of a desire to control judicial activism, advocate the
imposition of stricter limits on the power of courts to devise federal common law.
10. See Richard W. Garnett, Into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and
Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433 (1996) (discussing why the

judicial philosophy behind cases such as U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), may be used to question
the power of Congress to extend certain criminal laws in Indian Country).
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of federal power to the tribes," the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to
include tribes as beneficiaries of its federalist philosophy.1 2 Instead, the Rhenquist
Court, in the last twenty-five years or so, has been engaged in a concerted effort to
divest tribes of their inherent sovereign powers and indirectly transfer this power
to the states.
Perhaps the Court does not want to include devolution of power to the tribes
as part of its federalist jurisprudence because tribes are not part of the
Constitutional framework in that they are only mentioned in connection with the
Commerce Clause. 3 Further, tribes are not protected by the Tenth Amendment. 4
While it is true that Indian Nations were never asked to agree to the Constitution
as a prerequisite to joining the Union, they have been treated, as a result of
treaties, 15 acts of Congress, and Supreme Court opinions, as coming under the
jurisdiction of the United States political system. 16 This political incorporation
was accomplished against their will and was used many times to their detriment.
One could have hoped that in return, the Court would put an end to a
jurisprudence which stubbornly denies tribes their political rights within the
United States political system as if they still were alien nations. 17
PART II of this article first explains how the methodology used in Strate v.
A-1 Contractors will lead to a modification of the Montana approach in
determining tribal jurisdiction, over non-member on non-member fee land, within
Indian reservations. PART III analyzes the impact of Strate on tribal jurisdiction
over non-members on "Indian" land. Finally, PART IV examines the theoretical
11. See e.g., the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975) (providing for tribal contracting of federal programs administered for the benefit of
Indians), the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978), the Clean Water
Act, Pub L. 100-4 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 1377 (1988)) (providing for treatment of tribes as
states under certain conditions), and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2467 (codified at CAA § 301(d), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d) (1994)) (delegating federal authority to tribes
in order to administer certain provisions of the Act).
12. For an in depth analysis of why and how the tribes should be included in Our Federalism, see
Richard A. Monette, A New Federalismfor Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States
and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 617 (1994)
(arguing that treaties between the United States and the Tribes can serve as the foundation for the
inclusion of tribes in our Federalism). A similar idea was more recently explored by professor Frank
Pommersheim in "OurFederalism" in the Context ofFederal Courtsand Tribal Courts:An Open Letter
to the FederalCourts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 123 (2000).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, reads: "The Congress shall have the power.., to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
14. The Tenth Amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
15. For an insightful discussion of the Indians' perception of what the treaties represented see,
Robert A. Williams, "The People of the States Where They are Found are often their Deadliest
Enemies": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism,38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981 (1996).
16. For instance, Congress in 1871 enacted a law which proclaimed that Indian nations should no
longer be considered independent sovereigns with whom we can sign treaties, Act of March 3, 1871, ch
120, 60 Stat. 544, 566 (1994)(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 71 (1994)). But see, Milner S. Ball,
Constitution,Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 51.
17. Indians generally became citizens of the United States under the Indian Citizenship Act of June
2,1924, ch 233, 43 Stat. 253. For an analysis discussing what political philosophy can be used to explain
and legitimize the position of Indian Nations within the U.S. political system, see Janice Aitken, The
Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its Development, and at How Its Analysis Under
Social ContractTheory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115 (1997).
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implications of the Strate doctrine from a federalist and a foundationalist
perspective. 18 It also analyzes the impact of the Strate doctrine on certain aspects
of Congressional power over Indian affairs.
PART II: THE IMPACT OF STRATE V. A-1 CONTRACTORS ON TRIBAL
INHERENT POWER OVER NON-MEMBERS ON NON-MEMBER
LAND WITHIN INDIAN RESERVATIONS.
A. Montana v. United States
Although located within the geographic territory of the United States,
Indian nations have always been considered as having possession of a certain
degree of inherent sovereignty.1 9 This sovereignty, first acknowledged in treaties
signed between the United States and the tribes, was recognized early on by the
Supreme Court and described the tribes as domestic dependent nations possessing
a certain degree of sovereignty over both their people and territory. 20 However,
starting in 1978, the Court announced that Indian tribes had been implicitly
divested of any inherent sovereign powers which were inconsistent with their
status as domestic dependent nations. 1 Initially, the doctrine of implicit
divestiture applied to cases where the exercise of inherent powers was in conflict
with the overriding sovereignty of the United States.2 2 The Court considerably
expanded the scope of the doctrine in Montana v. United States.
The Court in Montana had to decide whether the Crow tribe had the
inherent sovereign power to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians hunting and
fishing on land owned by the State, but located within the Crow Indian
reservation. The Court started its analysis by quoting the following language from
U.S.v. Wheeler:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty have been held to have
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.... [T]hese limitations rest on the fact that the dependent
status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent
with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the
power of self-government... are of a different type. They involve only the relations
among members of a tribe. 24
The Montana Court then asserted that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what
is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is

18. This term is borrowed from professor David Getches' article, Conquering the CulturalFrontier:

The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
19. See Allison Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court Changing Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1993).
20. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
21. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
22. Id. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1979).
23. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
24. Id. at 564 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,326 (1978)).
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inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation."' 2
Having stated this general rule, the Montana Court somewhat backtracked
and recognized two exceptions to its general rule:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations even on non-Indian fee
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of non members who enter consensual relationship with the tribe or its
members, though commercial dealing, contracts, lease, or other arrangements. A
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on
26 the political integrity, the economic security or the health and
welfare of the tribe.
The Court did not elaborate on the exact nature of its two exceptions
beyond stating that they were not applicable in the case because "nothing in the
case suggests that such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threatens the tribe's
political or economic security." 27 In spite of the outcome in the Montana case,
tribal advocates could take comfort that the language of the second exception
could potentially be construed very broadly and give back the jurisdiction which
had been taken under the general rule.
B. Narrowingthe Montana exceptions.
Although the Strate Court reaffirmed that Montana v. United States 9 was
still the path-marking case controlling the decision in this area of the law, it was
undoubtedly perturbed by the almost schizophrenic incongruity between
Montana's general rule of no jurisdiction and the potentially broad phrasing of its
second exception. The broad language of the exception posed a problem for the
Strate Court because it could easily be used to confer jurisdiction over the traffic
accident to the tribal court even if it involved two non-Indians. However, after
dismissing the first Montana exception as not being applicable, the Strate Court
focused its attention on the second exception and stated "undoubtedly, those who
drive carelessly on a public highway running through the reservation endanger all
in the vicinity, and surely jeopardized the safety of tribal members. But if
Montana's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely
shrink the rule. 3 °
25. Id.

26. Id. at 565-66.
27. Id at 566.
28. For an in-depth legal history of the case and its background, see Wambdi Awanwicake

Wastewin, Strate v. A-i Contractors:IntrusionInto the Sovereign Domain of Native Nations, 74 N.D. L.
Rev. 711 (1998).
29. Montana,450 U.S. 544 (1981).
30. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58. The Court in Strate recognized that although the general rule is
that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe"- those powers a tribe enjoys apart

from express provision by treaty or statute- "do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe," this rule is subject to the two Montana exceptions under which a tribe
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After making a thorough analysis of all the precedents cited by the Montana
Court to justify the second exception, and remarking that "each of those cases
raised the question whether a State's (or territory) exercise of authority would
trench unduly on tribal self-government, 3 1 the Court stated that "read in
isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be misperceived. Key to its
proper application, however, is the Court's preface, [a tribe's inherent power does
not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations." 32
The Strate Court, therefore, moved away from inquiring as to whether the
non-member activity had a direct impact on the health and welfare of the tribe,
and refocused the inquiry on whether tribal jurisdiction over the accident was
really necessary to tribal self-government. 33 The Court then concluded that it was
not.
To reach this conclusion, however, the Court borrowed language used in
Williams v. Lee,34 a case which defined what was necessary to tribal selfgovernment for the purpose of limited state judicial jurisdiction over reservation
Indians. In doing so, the Court was able to considerably narrow Montana's second
exception.
Although Worcester v. Georgia35 held that the state of Georgia could not
have any jurisdiction whatsoever inside Cherokee territory, 127 years after that
decision the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee was able to declare that:
Over the years this Court has modified these principles in cases where essential
tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized, but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.... [E]ssentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
36
them.

The Court in Williams was in the end solicitous of tribal self-government in

holding that a state court could not have jurisdiction over a law suit based on a
transaction between the non-Indian plaintiff and the Indian defendant because
"there can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of reservation Indians to govern themselves." 37
can still retain jurisdiction; first, when non-members have entered into consensual relations
with the tribe or its members, and second, when the activities of the non-members have a
direct impact on the health, welfare, economic security or political integrity of the tribe.
31. Id. at 458.
32. Id. at 459.
33. Of course, this does not make the nature of the test any more specific since Montana'ssecond

exception itself may be viewed as a further delineation of what is necessary to tribal self-government.
34. The Williams Court stated, "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be governed by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-220 (1958).
35. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
36. Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20.
37. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. In other words, the right of reservation Indians to self-government
was equated with the right to exercise jurisdiction over reservation affairs. If this phraseology is kept,
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It is important to note, however, although Williams was about state courts
acquiring jurisdiction over Indian defendants, none of the authorities cited by the
Court dealt with that situation. The Williams Court cited five cases as authorities
for its principle. Three of these cases allowed suits by Indians against non-Indians
in state courts.3 These cases can be distinguished on the ground that allowing
Indians the option to sue in state courts is different from forcing them to defend
themselves in state courts. The fourth case was New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,39 a
case which upheld state criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had murdered
another non-Indian on an Indian reservation. 0

absent governing acts of Congress, tribal jurisdiction would pre-empt state jurisdiction only in cases
involving "reservation affairs." Asking whether a lawsuit involves a reservation affair seems different
than asking whether the activity of non-members have a direct impact on the tribal health, welfare,
economic security or political integrity. Some courts have attempted without much success to further
define what constitutes a "reservation affair." See e.g., Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405,
1407 (9th Cir. 1991); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor 942 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1991), and also a discussion
by Alex Tallchief Skibine, "Deference Owed Tribal Courts' JurisdictionalDetermination:Towards CoExistence, Understanding,and Respect Between Different JudicialNorms, 24 N.M. L. REv. 191, 198-01
(1994).
38. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Harisson
v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (1948).
39. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
40. Martin was solely grounded on an earlier Supreme Court case, United States v. McBratney, 194
U.S. 621 (1881), which held that Colorado had jurisdiction over such crimes involving only non-Indians
because Colorado entered the Union on an equal footing with the original states, exclusive federal
jurisdiction over the reservation had to be expressly reserved by the United States. The problem with
this theory is that it is the Federal government and not the original states which had exclusive
jurisdiction over Indian reservations to begin with. While it is true that under the equal footing
doctrine, Congress had to expressly indicate its intent not to have a particular reservation be part of a
new state or territory, there is no reason why it should have had to explicitly reserve exclusive federal
jurisdiction. This misunderstanding perhaps has its origin in Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880),
and its reformulation of another previous case, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878). A couple of
years before Langford, the Court in Harkness held that the territory of Idaho had no jurisdiction over
non-Indians within an Indian reservation because the Act of Congress organizing the Territory
provided that the lands of any Indian tribe shall not constitute part of the Territory of Idaho until the
tribe consent to such inclusion. Since the treaty between the United States and the Shoshone Indians
did not contain such tribal consent the Court found that "The [tribal] territory reserved, therefore, was
as much beyond the jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, of the government of Idaho, as if it had been set
apart within the limits of another country, or a foreign State." Harkness, 98 U.S. at 478. In Langford
however, the Court held that although Congress could except tribal lands when organizing a new state
or territory so that "they constitute no part of such territory, although they are included within its
boundaries,"(102 U.S. at 146) in order to benefit from this exception, the tribes had to have a treaty
with a specific clause requesting such an exemption. Otherwise, "Where no such clause or language
equivalent to it is found ...the lands held by them [the Indians] are a part of the territory and subject
to its jurisdiction, so that process may run there, however the Indians themselves may be exempt from
that jurisdiction." Id. at 147. Not only did tribes need a specific treaty clause signifying their intent to
be exempted from inclusion but in the absence of such a clause, the Court took the position that the
State had jurisdiction over non-members within Indian reservations. Not surprisingly, not many tribes
had such specific treaty clauses. For instance, in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), the Court found
that because the Osage Indian tribe did not to have such a clause in its treaty, the reservation was
within the territory of Oklahoma and such territory could tax cattle belonging to non-Indians and
grazing within the reservation under leases authorized by Congress unless the plaintiffs could show that
such taxation would be a "violation of the rights of Indians and an invasion of the jurisdiction and
control of the United States over them and their lands." After concluding that a tax upon the cattle of
non-Indians could not be deemed to be a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians, the Court
relied on Utah and N. Railway Co v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) and Maricopa & P. R. Co. v. Territory
of Arizona, 156 U.S. 347, and found that such local taxation could not be perceived to be in conflict
with congressional power over Indian commerce.
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The fifth and last authority cited in Williams v. Lee, to support its

formulation of the infringement test, was Utah and N. Railway Co. v. Fisher.4t The
issue in Fisher was whether the territory of Idaho had jurisdiction to tax a road
and property owned by a railroad but apparently located on an Indian reservation.
The Court allowed the tax because it would not have impaired any rights reserved
by the Indians in any treaty. Although the Fisher Court acknowledged that to
uphold state jurisdiction in all cases would interfere with the protection afforded
to the Indians in their treaty, it stated without providing any precedent for it, "the
authority of the territory may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with
that protection." 42 Having stated the rule, the Court took the position that the
right of the Indians could not be impaired by the taxing of the road because the
Indians had ceded the lands on which the road was built to the United States, and
"by force of the cession thus made, the land upon which the railroad and other
43
property of the plaintiff are situated was.. . withdrawn from the reservation.,
The use of Williams v. Lee, coupled with its earlier remark, that all cases
cited in Montana to support its second exception asked whether state jurisdiction
would not unduly trench on tribal self-government, indicate that the Court was
deciding whether tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian activities was necessary to
tribal self-government. It did so by determining whether state jurisdiction over
the same activity would "trench unduly" on tribal self-government.4
But,
deciding whether a state can assert jurisdiction because such jurisdiction does not
interfere with tribal self-government should be different than asking if the tribe
has any jurisdiction in the first place. For one thing, unless tribal and state

41. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. at 31-32. That same point was also made in Maricopa & P.R. Co. v. Territory of Arizona, 156
U.S. 347 (1895). In that case, the Court held that the territory could tax the property of a railroad
located within the Gila River Indian reservation. However, the railroad's property was obtained
pursuant to an Act of Congress and the Court, citing Fisher, took the position that the necessary effect
of the Congressional grant was to "withdraw the land from the operation of the prior act of
reservation. And the immediate consequence of such withdrawal, was to re-establish the full sway and
dominion of the territorial authority." Id. at 351. Fisher is somewhat ambiguous on this point,
however, because in answering the plaintiff's contention that by stipulation of the parties the lands had
to be considered as still being within the reservation, the Court took the position that because this
stipulated finding had to be read by reference to the legislation under which the lands were ceded, the
result would not change because the stipulation and finding "will not be so construed as to allow the
company to escape taxation by the force of a stipulation as to an alleged fact which that legislation
show does not exist." Id. at 33. The Fisher Court's analysis is revealing in that it never considered
whether the state taxation could interfere with tribal sovereignty or self-government. It only looked at
whether it would interfere with any specific right reserved to the tribe in any of the treaties it signed
with the United States. If that is the analysis that the Strate Court is seeking to adopt in determining if
a tribe has a right to regulate non-members, the answer will always be "no" unless such jurisdiction was
specifically reserved by the tribe in a treaty or specifically conferred on the tribe by an Act of
Congress.
44. Since the 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia,31 U.S. 315 (1932), the Court recognized that
under the commerce power, the exclusive right to regulate relations with the tribes was vested in the
Congress. From this time on, power within Indian reservations became to be shared between the
Federal government and the Indian tribes. At the onset, States had no power inside Indian
reservations, as put by the Supreme Court in 1959, "over the years this Court has modified these
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219-20 (1959).
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jurisdiction are mutually exclusive, they could both assert jurisdiction
concurrently.'
The Court therefore seemed to have reformulated the test deciding what was
necessary to tribal self-government for the purpose of determining if a tribe had
retained inherent sovereignty over nonmembers under the Montana test by adding
the requirement that such inherent jurisdiction could only exist if it did not
conflict with state jurisdiction. Furthermore, as discussed in the next section,
determining whether a tribe's assertion of jurisdiction over non-member activities
on non-member fee land is necessary to self-government, by asking whether a
state assumption of jurisdiction over the same activity will unduly infringe on
tribal self-government, will almost always result in a finding that the tribal power
is not necessary to self-government. In order to establish jurisdiction, this
methodology will more likely require tribes to persuade a court that state
jurisdiction has been pre-empted by the operation of federal law. In other words,
although Strate purported to follow Montana, its holding may lead to a
requirement that in order to exist, tribal jurisdiction over non-members will have
to be backed by some kind of positive federal law.46
C.A problematic deconstructionof Strate: Determining tribaljurisdictionby
reference to state jurisdictionwithin Indian reservations.
Under evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the permissibility
of state jurisdiction within Indian reservations, a tribe's interest in selfgovernment alone has never been enough to pre-empt state jurisdiction over nonmembers. 47 The only Supreme Court case dealing squarely with tribal and state
jurisdiction over non-members while on non-member fee lands is not promising.
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,4a the
Court could not achieve more than a plurality in any of the three opinions.
Although the initial issue was whether the counties had zoning authority over nonmember fee land located within the Yakima Indian reservation, the case turned on
a determination of whether the tribes had zoning authority.
After stating that this was a case where the tribe and the county could not
have concurrent jurisdiction, four justices relied on the Montana test to hold that

45. See e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv., 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
46. This does not mean that there has to be an express delegation or confirmation of tribal authority
by the United States Congress. In most cases, such as cases where tribal and state jurisdiction are

mutually exclusive, this requirement will amount to having to show that Congress has pre-empted state
jurisdiction.
47. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
The extent of federal pre-emption and residual sovereignty in the total absence of
federal treaty obligations or legislation is therefore something of a moot point.
The question is generally of little more that theoretical importance, however,
since in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of
federal and state jurisdiction.

Id.
48. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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the tribes never could zone non-member fee lands.49 At the most, the tribe could
appeal the county zoning decision to a federal court arguing that the zoning
ordinance at issue had both a direct and a severe impact on tribal health, welfare,
economy, and political integrity. Three justices, using the same Montana test,
found that counties can never exercise zoning authority over any lands within a
reservation.5 Relying on the tribe's power to "determine the essential character
of a given area" derived from the tribal treaty right to exclude non-members, two
justices held that the tribe could zone non-member fee lands if these lands were
located within an area where most of the land belonged to the tribe or tribal
members. 51 Assuming the intent of Congress when it enacted legislation allowing
non-members to acquire lands within an Indian reservation, these two justices
held that the county, and not the tribe, had zoning authority over that part of the
reservation where the majority of the land was held by non-members.
Cases such as Williams are different from the norm in that they involve
involve jurisdiction over both members and non-members. Justice Rhenquist's
statement in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue illustrates this
point:
The Court also recognized that in some instances a state law may be invalid because
it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own lavs and be ruled
by them (citing Williams v. Lee). But apart from those rare instances in which a
state attempts to interfere with the residual sovereignty of a tribe to govern its own
members, the tradition of sovereignty merely provides a backdrop
against which the
53
pre-emptive effect of federal law or treaties must be assessed.
The Court has stated that the tribes' interest in self-government is "grounded in
notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies seek an
accommodation between the interests of the tribes and the federal government, on
one hand, and those of the States on the other., 54 However, in the absence of
strong congressional policies militating against state jurisdiction, the judicial
"accommodation" has always favored the states' interest in regulating non-Indians
doing business within Indian reservations. 55 In most cases, a congressional
49. Justice White wrote that plurality opinion joined by Justices Rhenquist, Scalia, and Kennedy.
50. That opinion was authored by Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
51. Justice Stevens authored that opinion joined by Justice O'Connor. Justice Stevens never stated
exactly how much land must be out of Indian ownership before the tribe can lose its zoning
jurisdiction. He did mention that about half of the lands in the so-called open area had been alienated
to non-members. Justice Stevens' task was made easier in this case due to the fact that the tribe itself
had divided the reservation into an open and a closed part.
52. The fact that the case involved a non-Indian attempting to sue a tribal member in a state court
over a debt incurred on the reservation was crucial to the Williams court's determination that the tribal
court and not the state court had jurisdiction over the disputes. Id. Thus the Court stated that
"Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate
the affairs of Indians on a reservation." Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
53. 458 U.S. 832, 849 (1982)(dissenting opinion).
54. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
55. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)
(allowing state taxation of non-Indians buying cigarettes from Indians on the reservation); See also
Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.1997) (allowing state assessment of
Business transaction privilege tax on room rentals and food and beverage sales); Gila River Indian
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legislation or treaty will be necessary in order to pre-empt state jurisdiction over
non-members.

6

While the debate among the Marshall-Brennan faction and the RhenquistStevens position on these issues used to be about the kind of congressional57

legislation which would be sufficient to pre-empt or overcome a state's interest,
more recently the Court seems to have adopted Justice Rhenquist's view which
focuses on finding a congressional intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction. 58 In the
past, the Court has refused to focus solely on a congressional intent to pre-empt
state law and has taken the position that a specific congressional intent to preempt was not necessary 5 9 Recently, the Court has adopted the view that "whether
such immunity [from state jurisdiction] shall be granted is thus a question that is
"essentially legislative in character".. .. The question for us to decide is whether
Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such immunity, either expressly or by plain
implication., 60 Although this statement opens the door for deriving congressional

Community v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing state transaction privilege tax on sale of
tickets and concessionary items in connection with sporting and cultural events on reservation); Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing state sales
taxes on non-Indian goods sold on reservation by non-Indian sellers to non-Indian buyers); but cf.,
Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987).
56. See e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state taxation of nonIndian logging operations); Ramah Navajo School v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (taxation
of non-member contractor building schools on reservation), Mescalero Tribe v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
324 (1983) (regulation of non-member hunters), Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.
1989) (pre-empting state timber yield tax and timber reserve fund tax on non-Indian companies
purchasing tribal timber).
57. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, "State jurisdiction is pre-empted by
the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected
in federal law, unless the state interests at stakes are sufficient to justify the assertion of state
authority." Id. at 334. Compare Getches & Wilkinson, Cases and Materials on FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, 4th Ed., 437 (arguing that the pre-emption analysis should not involve a balancing of the
interests). Although it is true that the first cases invoking federal pre-emption did not contemplate
such balancing, see McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), Washington v. Confederated Tribes,
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (where the balancing was not done in the pre-emption analysis but in that part of
the opinion determining whether state taxation interfered with tribal self-government), later cases have
muddled the analysis. The preemption and infringement tests were at one time two distinct tests, see
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 448 U.S. 136,142-43 (1980), and some courts still make this
distinction, see Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987). When the issue involves state
jurisdiction over non-members, the Court has merged the two tests into a flexible pre-emption analysis
sensitive to the particular facts and legislation involved. In tax cases, courts have looked at several
factors including: the amount of tribal involvement with the taxed activity, whether the value of the
activity being taxed was generated on the reservation, whether the state was already regulating any
part of the activity being taxed, and whether there is any type of nexus between the tax and the amount
of services delivered by the state. See generally Richard J. Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians
Who Do Business with Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize the
Need for Indian Tribes to Enter Into Taxation Compacts with their Respective States, 78 OR. L. REV.
501 (1999).
58. Rhenquist had taken the view that "Absent discrimination, the question is only one of
congressional intent. Either Congress intended to pre-empt the state taxing authority or it did not."
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,177 (1980).
59. Justice Marshall stated "By resting pre-emption analysis principally on a consideration of the
nature of the competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional
intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the proposition that preemption requires "an express congressional statement to that effect." New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
60. Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,175 (1988). In the process of deciding whether
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intent by implication, the current Court's textualist philosophy, its reluctance to
use legislative history, and its focus on plain meaning will make it increasingly
difficult for it to find a congressional intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction absent
some plain legislative language to that effect.
The problem with deciding the extent of tribal authority by focusing only on
cases where state jurisdiction was challenged becomes evident when considering
the approach adopted in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation;61 a 1979 case decided between the Court's decisions in Oliphant and
Montana. The Colville case is interesting because it decided whether both the
tribe and the state had jurisdiction to tax non-Indians buying cigarettes on the
reservation. The Court's contrasting approaches to the resolution of these two
issues is revealing and underscores the conceptual fallacy in the Montana/Strate
type of reasoning.
Concerning state jurisdiction over the activity the Colville Court relied on
Williams v. Lee and McClanahan v. Arizona 62 and held that the state of
Washington was able to tax for the following reasons:
Washington does not infringe on the right of reservation Indians "to make their own
laws and be ruled by them"... merely because the result of imposing its taxes will
be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they are currently receiving. The

principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and
congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interest of the Tribes
63
and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State on the other.

Concerning the power of the tribe to assume jurisdiction, after observing
that the power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members was a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and
that the tribes retained this right unless divested of it by federal law or by
necessary implication of their dependent status, the Court stated the following:
[S]uch divestiture [has been found] in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government, as
when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to nonIndians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do
a non-member producing coal on the reservation was immune from state taxation, the Cotton
Petroleum Court added the following:
Although determining whether federal legislation has pre-empted state taxation of lessees of
Indian land is primarily an exercise in examining congressional intent, the history of tribal
sovereignty serves as a necessary "backdrop" to that process.... [E]ach case "requires a
particularized examination of the relevant state, federal and tribal interests".... Moreover
in examining the pre-emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we are cognizant of
both the broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal independence in
the field at issue.... [I]t bears emphasis that although congressional silence no longer entails
a broad-based immunity from taxation for private parties doing business with Indian tribes,
federal pre-emption is not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly- as compared to
impliedly- pre-empted the state activity."
ld.at 176-77.
61. 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
62. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
63. Washington, 447 U.S. at 156.
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not accord the full protection of the Bill of Rights.

64

The Court concluded that an overriding federal interest did not exist which was
frustrated by tribal taxation of non-Indians. The Colville Court would only deny a
tribal power if it was inconsistent with an overriding national interest.
If the Colville Court had applied the approach it used in deciding whether
the state had jurisdiction to a determination of whether the tribe had jurisdiction,
tribal jurisdiction could only have been allowed if there could be an
"accommodation" between the federal and tribal interests on one hand and the
state interest on the other. As stated previously, tribal interests in selfgovernment will generally not be able to pre-empt state jurisdiction over nonmembers unless they are supported by federal legislation or a treaty.
Unlike Colville, the Strate Court's focus on cases measuring whether the
tribe's interest in self-government is sufficient to bar state jurisdiction implies that
tribal authority will be stricken down as long as it is inconsistent or incompatible
with the interests the states may have in regulating the activity. This stands the
Colville Court's application of the original Oliphant doctrine to civil jurisdiction
cases on its head since the approach there was whether the tribal power was
inconsistent with an overriding federal interest.65 The Colville Court seemed to
have almost anticipated such problems when it stated that "even if the state's
interests were implicated by the tribal taxes, a question we need not decide, it
must be remembered that tribal sovereignty is66dependent on, and subordinate to,
only the Federal Government, not the states.,
The Strate Court's reference to state jurisdiction cases, therefore, leads to the
following conclusions: First, in those rare cases where a tribe could exercise
concurrent jurisdictions with the states, 67 such jurisdiction may still be allowed as
long as the non-member activity has a serious and direct impact on the tribe's
health, welfare, economic security, or political integrity. Second, in cases where
the exercise of tribal authority would conflict with state jurisdiction over the same
activity, the tribe will have to also show that state jurisdiction over the same
activity would be an interference with tribal sef-government. 68 However, when it
comes to non-members on non-member land, it seems that the only way for the
tribe to do this successfully is to show that state jurisdiction has been pre-empted
by an Act of Congress which also reaffirms the need for tribal jurisdiction in this

64. Id. at 153-54.
65. Oliphant,435 U.S. 191.
66. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
67. While two political units can have concurrent jurisdiction over taxation, it seems that most
regulatory activities such as zoning and traffic control call for mutually exclusive jurisdictions, see
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
68. The exact meaning of what is meant by "tribal self-government" is not clear. For a
comprehensive treatment of recent efforts by native people to achieve self-government see Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of
TribalSelf-Government and the Process of Self-Determination,1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1995); Jeffrey
Wutzke, Dependent Independence: Application of the Nunavut Model to Native HawaiianSovereignty
and Self-Determination Claims,22 A. INDIAN L. REv. 509 (1998).
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area.
The lack of elaboration given in Strate regarding the reasons for the Court's
conclusion has resulted in lower courts adopting an ad hoc approach in deciding
whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-members while on non-member fee
lands. 69 The next section demonstrates, some of the key issues involving cases
arising on non-member lands have focused on the breath of Montana's second
exception after Strate, and whether exhaustion of tribal remedies 70 was still
required.
D. Implementationof Strate in the lower courts.
1.

The breath of Montana's second exception after Strate.

One of the first cases decided in the aftermath of Strate was Wilson v.
Marchington.7' The case involved a traffic accident on a state highway running
through the Blackfeet Indian Reservation between a tribal member plaintiff and a
non-member defendant. The court held that the tribal judgment in favor of the
plaintiff could not be enforced in federal court because under Strate, the tribal
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The fact that Wilson was a tribal
member, while Strate involved two non-members, did not impress the Ninth
Circuit which treated it as a distinction without a difference and stated that "if the
possibility of injuring multiple tribal members does not satisfy the second
Montana exception under Strate, then, perforce, Wilson's status as a tribal
member alone cannot." 72 Although the court acknowledged that the "parameters
of the Strate holding are not fully defined," 73 it could not see how tribal interests
would be diminished or jeopardized by requiring the tribal member to present her
case in state or federal court rather than tribal courts.
Wilson was followed without much discussion in Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Red Wolf,74 a case involving a collision between a train and a car at a
railroad crossing which killed two tribal members. The accident took place on a
right of way owned by the non-Indian defendant but within the exterior
boundaries of the Crow Indian reservation. The trial in tribal court resulted in a
$250,000,000 verdict against the railroad. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court which granted cert, vacated the judgment and remanded in light of Strate.
Relying on Wilson, the Red Wolf court brushed aside the fact that the plaintiffs
here were tribal members and found that the tribal court did not have any
jurisdiction over the matter.
69. See infra Part V. (The cases involving disputes which occurred on tribal lands will be treated
separately).
70. See National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 417 U.S. 845 (1985), (holding that, as a matter of
comity, before litigants can challenge the jurisdiction of a tribe in a federal forum, they have to first
exhaust their tribal court remedies).
71. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).

72- Id. at 815.
73.

Ld.

74. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The problem with the Ninth Circuit's approach is that, while it continues to
claim that Montana's second exception will still be applied whenever the tribe can
show that a non-member's impact is "demonstrably serious" or when it is
necessary to "protect tribal integrity against serious encroachments by nonmembers", it does not provide examples of situations which would trigger the
exception. Thus, the Red Wolf court continues to say that "we do not reduce
tribal sovereignty to mere landownership, or equate a servient land estate with
political subordination,' 75 but concludes nevertheless that "we recognize that
when Congress provides for the conveyance of certain property rights from tribes
to non-member parties, it acts within its unique
authority to defease tribal
76
require.,
purposes
its
extent
the
to
jurisdiction
Before the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Marchington, one federal
district court has reached the opposite conclusion, holding the following:
injury to a single tribal member is sufficient to implicate the interests protected by
the second Montana exception. That exception protects not only a tribe's interest in
its health and welfare, but its interests in self-government and political integrity as
well. The right on a political community to govern disputes which involve its

members is an important part of self-governance.77
A more expansive view of the second exception was also taken by another
federal district court in Cheromiah v. United States.78 The court considered
whether tribal members could sue the United States for medical malpractice
which occurred at a federally run hospital located on the reservation. Although
the hospital may have been located on tribal lands, the court assumed, for less
than obvious reasons, that the hospital was located on lands "some how subject to
less tribal authority -as in Strate and Montana-, ' 79 and held that the two
Montana exceptions applied. Therefore, even though the suit was filed in federal
court, tribal tort law controlled and was applicable to determine liability.80 The
court explained:
[T]his is one of the unique situations in which the conduct of non-members so
impacts the "health or welfare of the tribe" that the second Montana exception
applies as well. Unlike Strate, this case does not present a routine auto accident

between two non-Indians, nor even a routine tort between an Indian and a nonIndian. Rather, the United States government has undertaken the responsibility of

providing
the primary emergency medical care to the members of the Acoma
81
Tribe.
It is unclear if this case will be upheld on appeal. Strate held that the judicial

75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Montana v. Bremner, 971 F. Supp. 436,438 (1997).
78. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (1999).
79. Id. at 1304.
80. See Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999); Chips v. United States, No. 925025, slip op. at 3 (W.D.S.D. April 28, 1993); Azure v. United States, No. 90-68-GF-PGH, slip op. at 910 (D.Mont. May 9, 1991).
81. ('heromiah,55 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
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power of the tribe can- never extend beyond the tribe's power to regulate and
found that the tribe did not have the power to regulate the conduct of nonmembers on the highway. Therefore, the fact that a plaintiff is a tribal member
should be irrelevant. If the issue in Cheromiah was whether the tribe could
regulate medical procedures in a hospital run by the federal government, tribal
jurisdiction would have been doubtful.
The impact of Strate on the Montana exceptions was also the focus of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Montana v. E.P.A.s2 In that case, the state of Montana
was challenging the validity of a EPA rule issued pursuant to the Clean Water
Act. The rule allowed the agency to treat a tribe as a state if under principles of
federal common law, the tribe had jurisdiction to manage all water resources,
including water belonging to non-member, within its reservation. Montana argued
that the EPA's continuing recognition of Montana as the leading authority was
invalid in light of more recent cases such as Strate and Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Reservation.83 According to the state of
Montana, EPA should have used a different methodology in determining whether
the Salish and Kootenai tribes had enough jurisdiction to be treated as states
under the CWA.
After holding that the EPA was correct in determining that Montana was
still the controlling precedent, the Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA's determination
that the Salish and Kootenai tribes had jurisdiction over all reservation water
resources within the reservation because water pollution on the reservation has a
direct and serious effect on the health and welfare of the tribe. There are two
factors that made this case unique. First, the EPA issued an administrative rule
which had interpreted section 518 (e) of the Clean Water Act8 as favoring tribal
jurisdiction because the Act created a presumption that water pollution does have
a serious and direct impact on health and welfare. 85 Generally, agency findings
are not reviewed de novo but under an arbitrary and capricious standard which
calls for a certain amount of judicial deference towards the agency's action.86 The
actual finding that the Salish and Kootenai tribes had jurisdiction in this case can
be considered an application of the law to the facts which also generate a
deferential standard of review. Under such standard, agency findings will be
upheld if reasonable. 87
82. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
83. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
84. Pub. L. No. 100-4, codified at 33 U.S.C. section 1377 (1988).
85. 56 Fed. Reg. 64878-80 (1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).

86. See 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). Under this section of the Administrative Procedure Act,
judicial review is limited to ascertaining whether the agency has looked at the relevant factors and has

not made any clear error of judgement. See also AMAN & MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAv 452-53,
describing arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
87. Although the district court treated this finding as an issue of fact due to a substantial amount of

deference, 941 F. Supp at 957, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court ruling on this issue without
mentioning the level of deference it was using, 131 F.3d at 1141. The problem with the EPA's position
was that it interpreted the CWA as allowing it to treat tribes as states only if tribes had jurisdiction
over all water resources within the reservation under evolving principles of federal common law.
Perhaps the EPA would have been better off had it interpreted section 518(e) of the CVA as an
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The Ninth Circuit in Montana Dept. of Transportation v. King took a
narrower approach to the second Montana exception.88 The issue was whether the
tribe had jurisdiction to impose its tribal employment laws on the state of
Montana while the state was performing construction work on a state highway
running through the reservation of the Fort Belknap Indian Community. After
observing that Strate cautioned that the second Montana exception was to be
narrowly applied, the Ninth Circuit summarily concluded that 'the Community's
goes beyond the "internal
assertion of authority over the State's own employees
89
functioning of the tribe and its sovereignty.'
Most importantly, the court remarked that tribal jurisdiction "instead
impinges on one of the State of Montana's sovereign responsibilitiesmaintaining Highway 66 and the right of way at its own expense." 90 This
statement provides a reason not to uphold tribal jurisdiction besides the rather
subjective, and the erroneous conclusion that enforcing tribal employment laws on
its reservation is not necessary to tribal self-government. Grounding the decision
on the impact tribal jurisdiction would have on the state's own responsibilities in
this area also attempts to inject into the analysis reference made in Strate that all
the cases cited to support the second exception had asked whether state
jurisdiction would not unduly trench on tribal self-government.
A similar approach was taken by a federal district court in Glacier County
School District No 50 v. Galbreath.91 The issue was whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over an order directing the school district to readmit a student which
had been expelled for disciplinary reasons. The expelled student was a tribal
member, the school district is a political subdivision of the state, and the
elementary school the student attended was located on land owned in fee by the
school district. Although the court phrased the issue in terms of whether the
conduct the tribe seek to regulate, the administration and operation of a school
district, was demonstrably serious and imperiled the economic security, political
integrity, or the health and welfare of the Tribe, the decision was founded on
different grounds. Thus the Court stated that:
The state of Montana, through its administrative agencies and courts, is the
authority responsible for safeguarding the inalienable right of children to a public
education. Accordingly, the public interest lies in ensuring the responsible state
agencies are free to apply their expertise in resolving the various issues associated
with providing and education to the children of the State.... [O]pening the tribal
court for the optional use of tribal member unhappy with the substance or pace of
the proceedings mandated by Montana law is not... necessary to tribal selfoutright congressional recognition that tribes do have jurisdiction over all water resources within their

reservations. For a comprehensive look at the decision see, Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron
Doctrine infederal Indian Law and the Agencies Duty to interpretlegislationin favor ofIndians:Did the
EPA reconcile the Two in interpretingthe "Tribes as States" section of the Clean Water Act, 11 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 15 (1998).
88. Montana Dept. of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1999).

at 1114.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 26 Indian Law Reporter 3221 (1999).
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government. 2
Some courts in further elaborating on the ramification of Strate are slowly
developing an understanding that the test deciding whether a tribe has jurisdiction
should not be based on a subjective conclusion about what is necessary to selfgovernment or has a serious impact on tribal health and welfare, but on whether
tribal jurisdiction would be incompatible with state jurisdiction over the same
activity.
The court in Glacier County also thought that requiring the school district to
exhaust tribal court remedies would be superfluous. Next, the article will examine
other cases which have dealt with the exhaustion of tribal remedies requirement in
the aftermath of Strate.
2.

The exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine after Strate.

The Strate Court concluded its analysis by adding the following footnote
which states in part:
When, as in this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance
of non-members conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally
evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such
conduct.... [T]herefore, when tribal court jurisdiction over an action such as this
one is challenged in federal court, the otherwise applicable exhaustion
93
requirement.., must give way, for it would serve no purpose other than delay.

The exhaustion of tribal court remedies was first mandated in National
farmers Union v. Crow Tribe94 where the Court found that although federal courts
had federal question jurisdiction to determine the extent of a tribe's jurisdiction,
the congressional policies favoring self-government and self-determination "favors
a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge."95 The
question after Strate was whether exhaustion is ever required in cases involving
activities of non-members on non-member fee land.
The Strate footnote is hard to reconcile with the Court's statement in
National Farmers Union that "the existence and extent of a tribal court's
jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to
which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a
detailed study of the relevant statutes .... 96 The Strate footnote also seems to
reverse the presumption of tribal jurisdiction over such matters established by the
Court in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Laplante97 when it stated: "Tribal authority over
the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
where

Id.
Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
471 U.S. 845 (1985).
Id. at 856.
Id. at 855-56.
480 U.S. 9 (1986). The case extended the tribal exhaustion of remedies requirement to cases
federal jurisdiction was grounded on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. 1332.
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sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
statute."93 Comparing the phrasing of Iowa Mutual with the wording of the Strate
footnote shows that while under Iowa Mutual the burden is on the non-Indian to
show that tribal jurisdiction has been taken by a federal enactment, the Strate
footnote puts the burden on the tribe to show the existence of a "federal grant
provid[ing] for tribal governance of non-member's conduct." 99
While some cases still require exhaustion because the underlying events
occurred on Indian lands,O'° or a dispute concerning whether the law suit arose on
Indian lands within a reservation, 01 most courts are in agreement with Glacier
County School District No. 50 v. Gallbreath'02 and have not required exhaustion.
For instance the Ninth Circuit did not require exhaustion in either Red Wolf 03 or
Montana Dept. of Transportationv. King.1°4 Interpreting Strate as adding a fourth
exception to the exhaustion requirement when "it is plain that no federal grant
provides for tribal governance of non-members conduct on land covered by
Montana's main rule,"' 05 the Ninth Circuit in both Red Wolf and King concluded
that exhaustion was not required when tribal court jurisdiction does not exist
under Montana and Strate. This argument, however, is tautological. It amounts to
stating that exhaustion of tribal remedies for the purpose of deciding whether the
tribal court has jurisdiction should not be mandated when the tribal court does not
have jurisdiction. 0 6 Under such an approach, the federal court will only require
exhaustion once it has decided that the tribe has jurisdiction. But allowing the
tribal courts to first decide this issue was the very purpose why exhaustion of tribal
court remedies were mandated in National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians.'°7
Other courts have been more partial to the exhaustion doctrine. For
instance, in Glendale Colony v. Connell,'08 the district court attempted to
distinguish Strate by stating the non-member defendant was not "simply traveling

98. Id. at 18.
99. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
100. See Navajo Nation v. Intermountain Steel Buildings Inc. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (1999).

101. See, e.g., Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Stump, 191 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
102. 26 Indian Law Reporter 3221 (1999). See discussion at notes 91-92.

103. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), see discussion at notes 74-76.
104. King, 191 F.3d at 1114. The case is discussed at notes 88-90.
105. Id. at 1115. As stated by the Supreme Court in National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe,

exhaustion is not required "where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass
or is conducted in bad faith, or where the action taken is patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to

challenge the court's jurisdiction." 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citations omitted).
106. After National Farmers,some courts seemed to impose a requirement that exhaustion could

only be mandated after the federal court made the initial decision that the case involved a "reservation
affair." I have previously argued that such a requirement did not make sense because it amounted to a

determination of whether the tribal court had jurisdiction. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed
Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determination: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect
Between Different Culturaland JudicialNorms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 198-01 (1994).
107. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).

108. 46 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (1997).
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through the reservation en route to a off reservation destination" but was a
resident of the Glendale Colony which had a permit to conduct business on the
reservation and had a continuous and ongoing presence on the reservation. In
mandating exhaustion, the Court took into account the fact that unlike the
plaintiff in Strate, this plaintiff was a tribal member. The Court concluded that
given the uncertainty, "it would be illogical not to apply the exhaustion
requirement which is designed to allow tribal courts to address, in the first
instance, the extent of their jurisdiction." 10 9 Whether the court was able to draw a
meaningful distinction or one which will eventually be held on appeal to be just
another distinction without a difference remains to be seen.
If the test was truly whether jurisdiction over a certain activity was necessary
to tribal self-government due to a direct impact on tribal health, welfare, political
integrity or economic security, it would be beneficial for the federal courts to first
hear what the tribal courts thought about the matter. However, the language of
the Strate footnote seems to leave no room for any exhaustion requirement. The
Strate footnote, therefore, provides the clearest indicia that the Strate Court has in
fact moved away from the previous understanding of the Montana test and has
refocused the inquiry on whether exercise of tribal authority is authorized by
Congress or compatible with state jurisdiction over the same activity. If the
inquiry is now whether Congress has preempted state jurisdiction in favor of tribal
authority or whether tribal authority over some activities would be incompatible
with state jurisdiction over the same activities, it becomes obvious that federal
judges can decide such issues without the benefit or input of tribal judges.
The lower courts are struggling with applying Strate because the Strate Court
itself was less than explicit about what it was doing. Although the conventional
wisdom is to restrict the application of the Montana-Strate line of reasoning to
activities of nonmembers on nonmember lands, the next Part of this article will
examine whether there are some repercussions for tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers on lands owned by the tribe or its members.
PART III: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF STRATE ON TRIBAL
JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS ON LANDS OWNED BY
THE TRIBE OR ITS MEMBERS.
A.

The right to exclude v. inherent sovereignty.

After Montana came down with its general rule and its two exceptions, many
wondered if the rule and its exceptions were applicable to other types of lands
within Indian reservations such as tribal lands or lands held in trust for individual
tribal members. The Montana Court stated, "The Court of Appeals held that the
Tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the
Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, and with this holding we

109. Id at 1065.
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can readily agree."' 10 The question left unanswered was why the Court was so
willing to agree? Was it because Montana's general rule was just not applicable to
such lands, or because one of the two Montana exceptions applied to preserve
tribal power over non-Indians? Montana itself seems to indicate that its general
rule was applicable regardless of who owned the land since it was based on the
notion that upon incorporation into the United States, Indian tribes lost all powers
over non-members because it became inconsistent with their tribal status to be
able to independently determine their external relations.
The Court in Strate was careful to state that it expressed no opinion on
whether the same result would obtain if the incident arose on a tribal road within
the reservation."' However, in El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Neztsosie,"2 in
addressing the petitioners' argument that Strate prevented tribal jurisdiction over
a tort case involving radioactive contamination, the Court summarily distinguished
Strate stating "But Strate dealt with claims against non-members arising on state3
highways.... [B]y contrast the events in question here occurred on tribal lands.""1
This article takes the position that although the tribe would have had
jurisdiction if the events in Strate had occurred on a tribal road, the important
issue here is that some courts have drawn a distinction between tribal jurisdiction
based on inherent sovereignty and jurisdiction based on the "right to exclude,"
and have emphasized that tribal jurisdiction over non-members is solely derived
from the "right to exclude." This is an important distinction because if jurisdiction
is only based on the right to exclude, then the Montana rule applies to such lands
once the tribe has lost such right, and the tribe has to rely on one of the two
exceptions in order to have jurisdiction.
Grounding the tribal power over non-members as being derived from the
right to exclude instead of inherent sovereignty allows those Justices who may
believe that tribes have in fact lost all "inherent" sovereign powers over nonmembers upon incorporation into the United States to be doctrinally consistent
with their understanding of Montana while still upholding tribal power over nonmembers while on tribal land. On the other hand, it allows those Justices to
expand the application of the Montana principle to all lands except those where
the tribes have retained the right to exclude.
This article concludes that drawing such a dichotomy between the right to
exclude and inherent tribal sovereignty is disingenuous because the right to
exclude is itself derived from inherent sovereignty." 4 As early as the Chinese
Exclusion case, 5 the Court recognized this self-evident principle." 6 Yet, this

110. Montana,450 U.S. at 556.
111. Strate, 520 U.S. at442.
112. 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
113. Id. at 483 n.4. The Court concluded, however, that the tribal court had no jurisdiction but that it
was solely because tribal regulatory authority had been pre-empted by federal law.
114. See e.g. United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
115. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
116. In the Chinese Exclusion case, the Court stated: "that the government of the United States,
through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition
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distinction played a crucial role in extending the Montana rule to the federally
owned lands in South Dakota v. Bourland"7 and the state's right of way in Strate.
The following discussion focusing on Merrion v. Jicarilla Tribe18 and Bourland,
explains the nature of the distinction and why it matters.
B.

Merrion v. JicarillaTribe.

The issue in Merrion was whether the Jicarilla Apache Tribe could impose
an oil and gas severance tax on non-Indian lessees who produced oil and gas
within the reservation pursuant to a lease they had signed with the tribe. Justice
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court and held that the tribe had the
inherent sovereign power to impose such a tax. Therefore, the tribe had not lost
this right even though it had failed to reserve it in its lease with the non-Indian oil
producers. Relying on Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
11 9 the Merrion Court stated:
reservations,
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a
necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. The power
does not derive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from
tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to
control economic activity within its jurisdiction .... 120
Justice Stevens, whose dissent was joined by Justice Rhenquist and the Chief
Justice, wrote an unusually long dissenting opinion. His main point was that the
tribe's authority over non-Indians only emanated from its power to exclude them
from the lands. Since the tribe did not reserve the power to impose new taxes on
the non-Indian lessees when it agreed to the lease, the tribe had lost the power to
impose new taxes on the non-Indian lessees. According to Justice Stevens, when
the tribes were incorporated in the United States, they lost their status as
independent nations and "were afforded no general powers over citizens of the
United States., 12'
Although Justice Stevens recognized that tribes do have
sovereign powers, the tribes can only exercise such powers over their own
1
members. After referring to language in Montana and United States v. Wheeler, 22
indicating that tribes have no inherent powers over non-members, Stevens
concluded:
The tribe's authority to enact legislation affecting non-members is therefore of a
different character than their broader power to control internal affairs. This
difference is consistent with the fundamental principle that "in this nation each
sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed."... [A]n examination of
which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an
incident of every independent nation." Id. at 603.
117. 508 U.S. 679 (1990).
118. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
119. 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
120. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137 (the Court also cited Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), as
precedent).
121. L at 160.
122. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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cases that have upheld this [taxing] power, however, demonstrate that the power to
impose such a tax derives solely from the tribe's123power to exclude non-members
tribe.
from territory that has been reserved for the

Observing that "the dissent confuses the Tribe's role as commercial partner
with its role as sovereign,' ' 124 the majority rejected Justice Stevens' analysis and
found that Steven's view denigrated Indian sovereignty by relegating it to a power
which is possessed by any individual landowner. Concerning the dissent's
implication that the power to tax depends on the consent of the taxed as well as on
the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians, the majority stated:
Whatever place consent may have in contractual matters and in the creation of

democratic governments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an
exercise of legitimate sovereign authority.... [O]nly the federal government may
limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign authority. Indian sovereignty is not
conditioned on the assent of a non-member.125

Although Justice Stevens lost this particular battle, his words might not have
been written in vain and he might be on the verge of winning the war. Thus the
cases: Duro v.
views expressed in his dissent were later adopted in three important
2
27
8
Reina,'26 South Dakota v. Bourland, and of course, Strate.'

C. South Dakota v. Bourland:Overturning Merrion sub silentio?
The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could
assert jurisdiction over non-members hunting and fishing on lands located within
the reservation but which had been acquired from the tribe by the United States
for a Dam and Reservoir project. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas stated
that in enacting the 1944 Flood Control Ac129 and the 1954 Cheyenne River
Act, ° Congress had abrogated the Tribe's right under the 1868 Fort Laramie
Treaty 131 to regulate non-member hunting and fishing on lands acquired by the
United States pursuant to these two Acts.
The Court focused on the fact that the "right" the tribe had possessed to
control non-Indian hunting and fishing within the reservation came from the
treaty giving the tribe "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the
reservation. According to the Court, these words gave the tribe the power to
exclude others and arguably conferred upon the Tribe the lesser included,
123. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 172-173 (Justice Stevens cited Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, for the
proposition that the power to govern derives from the consent of the governed).
124. Id. at 146-47.
125. Id.at 147.
126. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
127. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
128. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Justice Stevens' opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408
(1989), also reflected this view in that it only relied on the right to exclude. Because there was no
majority but only a plurality, Stevens' opinion, joined only by Justice O'Connor, dictated the result for
the two pieces of land involved in that litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
129. 1944 Flood Control Act, ch. 6645,58 Stat. 887 (1944).
130. 1954 Cheyenne River Act, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954).
131. 1968 Fort Laramie Treaty, April 29,1868, 15 Stat. 635, 1868 WI. 5271.
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incidental power, to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on these lands.
Since the tribe lost its right to exclude when the United States acquired these
lands from the tribe pursuant to the Flood Control and Cheyenne River Acts, the
Court held that Congress also eliminated the incidental regulatory jurisdiction
formerly enjoyed by the Tribe because these two acts did not expressly provide for
the continuance of tribal jurisdiction over non-members.
Focusing on whether Congress intended the tribe to lose jurisdiction over
non-Indians in the Flood Control and the Cheyenne River Acts, and concluding
that unlike the legislation at issue in Montana, neither of the two Acts reflected
any congressional intent to diminish the tribe's powers of self-government, the
dissent stated:
the majority's myopic focus on the treaty ignores the fact that this treaty merely
confirmed the Tribe's pre-existing sovereignty over the reservation land. Even on
the assumption that the Tribe's treaty-based right to regulate hunting and fishing by

non-Indians was lost with the Tribe's power to exclude133non-Indians, its inherent
authority to regulate such hunting and fishing continued.

Unimpressed by this argument, Justice Thomas for the majority asserted that
the purpose of the legislation allowing for the transfer of lands out of tribal
ownership was irrelevant and was not the determinative factor in Montana. As
long as the tribe had lost the power to exclude, it had lost jurisdiction. This is why
Justice Thomas answered the dissent in footnote 15 of the opinion by stating:
While the dissent refers to our "myopic focus" on the Tribe's prior treaty right to
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the taken area, it shuts both eyes
to the reality that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over non-members "cannot
134
survive without express congressional delegation" and is therefore not inherent."'

Underlying the Court's position is the same view which was first expressed by
Justice Stevens in his Merrion dissent: once the specific treaty right to exclude is
waived or taken away, tribes seem to lose all powers over non-members unless
one of the two Montanaexceptions apply.135
Although, at first, Bourlandseems to be only applicable to prevent inherent
tribal jurisdiction over non-member while on non-members owned land, the

132 Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687-88.
133. Id. at 701.
134. Id. at 695, n.15 (citing Montana,450 U.S. at 564). It seems counterintuitive, and perhaps even a
contradiction in terms to say that in order to "survive", tribal sovereignty has to be "delegated"
through express congressional legislation.

135. Justice Thomas did mention the two Montana exceptions but took the position that the Court
could not decide this issue because the Court of appeals had not addressed them in remanding them

for consideration to the district court which had held that they were not applicable. Bourland,508 U.S.
at 695. The mention of the exceptions is puzzling, however, since their existence is hard to reconcile
with the court's prior statement concerning the total lack of inherent sovereignty absent congressional
delegation. Thus after stating that "general principles of "inherent sovereignty" also do not enable the
Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area," Id. at 694, and following those
words with a statement in footnote 15 that "after Montana, tribal sovereignty over non-members

"cannot survive without express congressional delegation" Id. at 695. Justice Thomas nevertheless
asserted that "the question remains, however, whether the Tribe may invoke other potential sources of
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on these lands. Montana discussed two exceptions ...." Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss2/2

24

2000]

Skibine: The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement
IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE DOCTRINE

decision may not be so limited. If the only reason Montana's general rule is not
applicable on Indian land is that the tribes there have retained the right to
exclude, absent the application of one of the Montana exceptions, the tribes may
have lost jurisdiction over non-members who are conducting activities on trust
lands owned by individual members of the tribe when these non-members are on
such lands with the consent of the tribal owners. Although many scholars have
136
taken the position that tribes would retain full jurisdiction over such lands, the
issue is not free from doubts.
Perhaps the Strate Court really wanted to build on Justice Thomas' inference
in Bourland and hold that a congressional intent to divest tribes of not only the
right to exclude, but also all inherent sovereignty can be implied whenever land is
transferred to non-members. 37 This position would not only be inconsistent with
every rule of statutory construction developed by the courts over the years, but it
also cannot be reconciled with many other cases recognizing tribal jurisdiction
However, in some respect, the Strate
over non-members in other contexts.
Court took Justice Thomas' Bourland opinion one step further. In spite of its
contradictory and sometimes confusing language, Justice Thomas' opinion in
Bourland at least went through the pain of analyzing, in detail, the congressional
acts which took the land out of tribal ownership, before holding that they
evidenced a clear congressional intent to abrogate the tribe's pre-existing right to
control non-Indian hunting and fishing. The Strate court on the other hand,
dispensed with the analysis all together. After bluntly asserting that "the right of
way is open to the public and traffic on it is subject to the State's control, 1 39 the
Court relied on Bourland and held that because the tribes have consented to the
right."1 40
state's use of the highway "They have retained no gatekeeping
Therefore because they have lost the right to exclude, the right of way should be
treated the same as the fee lands in Montana for the purpose of determining tribal
jurisdiction.
D. Recent lower court cases.
The lower court decisions which have followed in the wake of Strate have,
with an occasional exception, 41 generally taken the position that the reason tribes

136. See e.g. Allison Dussias, Geographically-Basedand Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal

Sovereignty The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 Prr. L. REV. 1, 61 n.259 (1993), and Judith

Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral
Resources,29 TULSA L.J. 541,609 (1994).
137. Bourland,508 U.S. at 692.
138. See Frickey, supranote 6, at 45-48.
139. Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56.
140. Id. at 456.
141. See e.g., Hawood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, 946 P.2d 1088 (1997), where the New Mexico Court of
Appeals upheld tribal jurisdiction over tribal members' claim against a non-member car dealer who
improperly repossessed plaintiffs' car while on tribal lands. The court did not find tribal jurisdiction
because of the right to exclude but under Montana'sfirst exception, stating that "tribes possess such
authority over the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribes'
members through commercial dealings and contracts." Id. at 1092.
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retain jurisdiction over non-members on lands owned by the tribe or its members,
is that the tribes have the right to exclude. This refocuses the judicial inquiry away
from whether tribes have inherent sovereignty to regulate, to whether they
actually have preserved the right to exclude. The Ninth Circuit decision in State v.
Hicks'42 is indicative of what the debate is all about.
The issue in Hicks was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a
case filed by a tribal member against a state game warden for a variety of torts
alleged to have taken place in connection with the search of the plaintiff's car
while on tribal lands. The majority held that the tribal court had jurisdiction
because unlike Strate and Montana, "the incidents underlying the instant case
occurred on Indian-owned, Indian-controlled land, over which the tribe retained
its right to exclude non-members. 143 Crucial to the court's holding was the fact
that the tribe had not consented to allow state officials to conduct search and
seizure operations on the reservation to investigate state crimes, without a tribal
search warrant. Therefore, in the instant case, when the tribal court agreed to
grant the state warden's request for a warrant, it was exercising its "gatekeeping
land
right" and "The tribe's unfettered power to exclude state officers from its
'
implies its authority to regulate the behavior of non-members on that land."' 4
The Dissent argued that in fact the state game wardens had been given
permission by the tribal court to execute a warrant. Therefore, their right to be on
the reservation was no less absolute than the non-members in Strate and another
recent case, County of Lewis v. Allen. 145 In County of Lewis, the court held that
the Nez Perce Tribe lacked jurisdiction over a member's action against the
County. This was because in entering into an agreement with the County giving
County officers the authority to enter the reservation to investigate minor crimes
exclude state officials engaged
and make arrests, the tribe had ceded the right "to
146
in law enforcement activities on the reservation.'
The Hicks majority answered this argument by taking the position that
unlike the situation in County of Lewis, "There was no general cession of
jurisdiction by the tribe; instead there was a controlled, limited permission for
state officials to come onto tribal land and comport themselves to the parameters
of that permission."' 147 Whether the case can be distinguished from County of
Lewis that easily is questionable. Is there really a material difference between
granting warrants to state officers on a case by case basis and allowing state
officers to investigate crimes on the reservation on a more general basis? If there
is a difference, it seems to be one of degree and not of substance.148 Yet, these
cases are typical of the kind of issues that are likely to be debated once it is agreed
142. 196 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999).

143. Id. at 1027.
144. Id. at 1028.
145. County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

146. Id. at 514.
147. Hicks, 196 F.3d at 1029.
148. As of this writing, the United States Supreme Court had granted the petition for certioraribut
had not yet decided the case.
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that the tribes' authority to regulate non-members on tribal lands is derived from
the power to exclude instead of the general inherent powers of a sovereign.
As previously stated, the courts' struggle with this issue comes from a
misconception about the "right to exclude" as being derived solely from the
149
creation of the reservation either by treaty, act of Congress, or Executive Order.
This misconception misleads some jurists into treating the power to exclude as if it
was just another power possessed by all landowners. In fact, the power to exclude
is derived from the tribe's inherent sovereignty. 15 0 Its existence does not depend
on having been expressly retained in a document. As stated by the Court long
ago, "[t]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them- a reservation of those rights not granted.''
Although Strate may have reformulated the second Montana exception, the
next Part discusses whether it may have been influenced by its own federalist
jurisprudence concerning the proper role of the judiciary in creating rules of
federal common law.
PART IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATE DOCTRINE.
A.

A Justificationfor Stratefrom a FederalistPerspective.

Having announced a "general rule" that any jurisdiction over non-Indians
had been lost upon incorporation into the United States, the Montana Court
resurrected inherent tribal sovereignty from the ashes of its general rule. The
Montana Court advanced two exceptions to its rule of no tribal jurisdiction over
non-members. The problem from a federalist perspective is that Montana's
second exception can potentially recognize the existence of tribal powers over
non-members in a vast number of situations without any justification other than
that such non-member activity has a direct impact on tribal health and welfare. A
federalist Court may find it hard to be faithful to both Montana'sgeneral principle
that upon incorporation in the United States, tribes lost all inherent powers over
non-members, and the phrasing of its second exception which seems to allow
courts to recognize additional tribal powers based upon a seemingly independent
judicial judgment that such powers are "necessary to tribal self-government."
Implicit divestiture is a federal common law doctrine. 52 The requirement
that tribal power over non-members has to be authorized by Congress is
consistent with federalist jurisprudence concerning the power of the judiciary to
create rules pursuant to federal common law. Perhaps the Strate Court did not
perceive any justification emanating from the Constitution, treaties, or federal

149. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
150. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
151. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
152. Federal common law has been described as judge made law. In other words, rules of decision
adopted by federal courts that have the force of law and effect of positive federal law but "whose
content cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional
command." Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 36:267

legislation, and therefore was reluctant to use federal common law to expand
tribal powers beyond the general rule without explaining why these exceptions
were necessary to protect a federal interest. However, determining the existence
of tribal power by reference to whether state jurisdiction has been pre-empted
does conform with a federalist approach to the Judiciary's power to create rules.
Under the Indian pre-emption doctrine, tribal power will only prevail over a
state's own assertion of power if it has some backing or support in positive federal
law.15 3
Some scholars have argued that the creation of rules through federal
common law raises serious separation of power concerns. As stated by one
scholar, "there can be no such thing as federal common law at least to the extent it
is used to provide a rule of decision and to the extent that the phrase common law
is construed as a category of lawmaking distinct from constitutional or statutory
interpretation." 154 To alleviate these concerns, one scholar has put forth the axiom
that the Court can make federal common law only if the rule is in furtherance of a
basic feature of the constitutional scheme.155 Others believe that federal common
law is allowable as long as the court can point to some "authority" such as a treaty,
a statute, or the Constitution. 156 In her landmark work on federal common law,
professor Martha Field explained that she favors a requirement that courts specify
the authority to sustain its federal rule because:
a requirement that a federal court locate the power under which it acts seems to fit
better with the notion of the federal government as one of limited powers. Most
important, perhaps, the recitation of an authority interpreted to sustain the federal
common lawmaking power takes more seriously the conception that Congress has
the last word both on whether
the area should be federalized and on what rule
157
govern.
to
selected
be
should
Some of the problems relating to the creation of rules through the federal
common law were raised in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies.' After
observing that even though the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was not
relevant or mandated by any federal interest supporting tribal self-government,

153. See discussion infra Part II.B.
154. Martin Reddish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: an
InstitutionalistPerspective,83 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 761, 792 (1989).
155. See Bradford R. Clark, FederalCommon law, a StructuralReinterpretation,144 U. PA. L. REV,
1245 (1996). As stated by professor Clark, "This criterion asks whether judicial application of the rule
in question constitutes either the application of rules implied directly from the constitutional structure,
or adherence to customary rules of decision necessary to implement a basic feature of the
constitutional scheme." Id. at 1275.
156. See Martha Field, Sources of Law, the Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881
(1986) (hereinafter Field). The Supreme Court's position is that federal common law is limited but
only according to subject matter. According to the Court, the enclaves appropriate for federal
common law include "such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of states or our
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630,
641 (1981). Professor Field believes that this position "does not provide any underlying rationale other
than grandfathering." Field, supra note, at 911-12.
157. Field, supra note 156, at 947.
158. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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the Supreme Court held that the tribes had sovereign immunity even for a
transaction involving commercial activities taking place outside the reservation.
This moved Justice Stevens in dissent to state: "First the law-making power that
the Court has assumed belongs in the first instance to Congress. The fact that
Congress may nullify or modify the Court's grant of virtually unlimited immunity
does not justify the Court's performance of a legislative function." 159 Justice
Stevens concluded that although the creation of a federal common law "default"
rule of immunity might in theory be justified by federal interests, the majority
opinion had acknowledged that such interests were lacking. Use of the common
law to recognize such immunity was, therefore, illegitimate.
Justice Stevens' point was that under the separation of power principle, each
branch of the government is supposed to only conduct its assigned role and not
aggrandize itself at the expense of another branch by exercising that branch's
function. 160 Although the Constitution vests with Congress the sole role of initially
determining the relations between the tribes and the United States, Stevens's
argument was that in the absence of any treaty or statutes, the Court's extension
of the immunity to cover commercial transactions occurring off the reservation
without grounding this extension in a federal interest was an usurpation of
Congressional power.
The difference between Stevens and the majority was that the majority
believed that it was not extending the immunity. Unlike the tribal power to
regulate non-members traveling on a state highway running through the
reservation, the Manufacturing Technologies majority believed that complete
tribal sovereign immunity from suit survived incorporation. The Court was
therefore not extending the immunity but just refusing to abrogate it, preferring
instead to leave that task to the Congress.
The Strate Court, being a court with federalist tendencies, should agree with
the position that federal courts have to identify the authority giving them the
power to create rules of federal common law. Not wanting to go back and adopt
the Colville line of reasoning16 1 since it would not result in a divestiture of tribal
powers over traffic accidents, the Strate Court may have attempted to reconcile its
implicit divestiture jurisprudence with its conception of federal common law by
reformulating Montana's second exception. Requiring tribes to show that
jurisdiction over non-members is necessary to tribal self-government, by asking
whether state jurisdiction over such activity would unduly trench on tribal selfgovernment, grounds the determination of what is or is not necessary to tribal selfgovernment in federal statutory law, since state jurisdiction over non-members is
not preempted unless the tribes interest in self-government is supported by

159. Id. at 764.
160. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v.
Chadda, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
161. Under Colville, a tribal power is divested only if it is in conflict with an overriding national
interest. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
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positive federal law.162 As the next section demonstrates, however, the Court in
Strate would have been better off following the Manufacturing Technologies
majority's methodology and refuse to abrogate tribal civil authority over its
reservation absent a congressional pronouncement to that effect.
B.

The Flaw in Strate and Montanafrom a FoundationalistPerspective. 63

Professor Field observed that in some areas of the law, such as federal Indian
law for instance, courts sometimes fail to address the authority for federal
common law simply because the existence of such authority is so well established.
She cited to Johnson v. M'intosh1 64 and mentioned Worcester v. Georgiat65 for the
statement that the reason the pre-existing common law remained in effect was
because it
was adopted in treaties between the Indians and the United States, and between the
United States and Britain, whose rights passed to the United States after the
revolution; and the Constitution declares that treaties
166 previously made as well as
future treaties are to be the supreme law of the land.
Justice Marshall was faithful to this view and in Worcester v. Georgia, he
relied on the historical relationship the tribes had with England, as well as treaties,
the constitution, acts of Congress, and principles of international law to state:
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians, which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial
167
boundaries, within which their authorityis exclusive.
Under the traditional view, treaties have always been considered not as a
grant of sovereignty from the United States to the tribes, but a reservation by the
tribes of all the powers not expressly given up in the treaty.16 In other words,
tribes did not have to expressly reserve a specific inherent power in a treaty in
order for that inherent power to continue to exist. Contrary to Marshall's
position, the Montana and Strate Courts did not seem to believe that under preexisting common law, tribes had any authority over non-members. Therefore, for
such jurisdiction to exist while remaining consistent with the Strate Court's
jurisprudential philosophy concerning the courts' power to create rules of federal
162. See discussion infra Part I1.C. at notes 54-60.
163. As stated earlier, this term is borrowed from David Getches' article, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier,see Getche supranote 17.

164.
165.
166.
167.

21 U.S. 543 (1823).
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Field, supranote 156, at 948-49.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 577. For a comprehensive overview of Justice Marshall's Indian

jurisprudence, See Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPastandPresent: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and
Interpretationinfederal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1993).

168. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Charles Wilkinson and John Volkman,
JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as the Water Flows and the Grass Grows Upon
the Earth"- How Long a Time is That? 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975).
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common law, it would have to have been specifically referred to in a Treaty or
supported by congressional legislation.
Although Congress has the primary or even exclusive responsibility to
determine the relations between the United States and the Indian tribes, the
implicit divestiture doctrine seems, at first, necessary to implement a basic feature
of the constitutional scheme if Congress has failed to address the issue of tribal
authority. Under the separation of powers doctrine courts can only make federal
common law if Congress has not spoken on the issue. However, in this case, it
seems that Congress has in fact spoken on this issue. Although the Supreme
Court seems to assume that tribes never had any jurisdiction over non-members,
even before the first treaty was signed, no one can honestly read the early treaties
and think that the Congress was under the impression that the tribes did not have
power to regulate non-Indians living within their borders. In spite of contrary
statements in Oliphant v. Suquamish tribe, 69 the tribes even had the power to
criminally regulate non-Indians. A common clause in the early treaties was the
following: "if any citizen of the US or other person not being an Indian shall settle
on any of the Cherokees' lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of the US,
and the Cherokees may punish him or not, as they please.' 70
The Court should, therefore, only be able to divest the tribes of jurisdiction
over non-members if it can interpret treaties or acts of Congress as divesting tribes
of that inherent power. The court in Montana by-passed this requirement by
asserting as a general rule that tribes lost that jurisdiction upon incorporation and
then carving out two exceptions. Once it is established that there never was such
general rule until the Court made it up, it is the Court's own implicit divestiture
doctrine which becomes suspect under separation of power principles since it
divest the tribes of authority without invoking any federal interest justifying such
divestiture.171
Crucial to the Montana Court's formulation of its general rule was the
Supreme Court's statement in United States v. Wheeler'72 that Indian tribes had
lost all jurisdiction over non-Indians upon incorporation into the United States
because it was inconsistent with their status for the tribes to independently
determined their external relations. However, a search for the basis of the
Wheeler statement reveals that it was not supported by any legitimate authority.
The only authority cited in Wheeler was Justice Johnson's concurrent opinion in
Fletcher v. Peck where he stated: "the restrictions upon the right of soil in the
Indians, amount... to an exclusion of all competitors [of the United States] from

169. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
170. See Article VIII of the treaty of 1791 with the Cherokees, 7 Stat. 39.
171. The difference between the Oliphant brand of the implicit divestiture doctrine and the Montana

one is that the Court in Oliphant found that the inherent tribal power to criminally prosecute nonmembers had been divested because it was in conflict with the overriding sovereign interest of the
United States, grounded in the United States Constitution, to protect its citizens from an unwarranted
intrusion in their personal liberty. As developed in Oliphant, therefore, the implicit divestiture
doctrine does not suffer from the problems plaguing the Montanabrand of the doctrine.

172. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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their markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of
governing every person within their limits except themselves." 173 However,
whatever precedential value Justice Johnson's views on this issue may have had,
they were clearly overruled in Worcester v. Georgia174
What this shows is that Montana's "general rule" was in fact not a general
rule at all until the Court decided to make it so. The fact that there was no general
rule to begin with makes the Strate Court's attempt to further determine the
meaning of the second exception through a scrupulous reliance on the authorities
cited to support it that much more suspect. 175 The general rule, not being a general
rule, it is no wonder that the precedents cited to justify the exceptions were not
appropriate. This explains the Montana Court's reliance on cases which dealt with
assertion of state jurisdiction inside Indian Country. Most of the litigated cases
involving the issue of tribal self-government had dealt with states' attempts to
assert jurisdiction since the tribes' own power over civil matters had been firmly
established since Worcester and had gone mostly unchallenged. The Court was
able to cleverly avoid citing cases which had challenged and upheld tribal
jurisdiction on broader grounds by listing these cases as justifying the first
exception.
An analysis of the cases cited to support the first exception exemplifies the
Court's strategy and reveals how the Montana court was able to seriously shrink
the recognized sphere of tribal authority. The first exception phrased the
existence of tribal jurisdiction as deriving from the fact that the tribes had entered
into "consensual relations" with the non-Indians. An examination of the
precedents cited reveals that this insistence on the "consensual" aspect of the
relationship is something no other courts had highlighted in the past. For
instance, in the most recent of the cited authorities, Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,176 the Court did not uphold the tribal
taxing power over non-Indians because it involved consensual relations but
because tribes had inherent authority over any non-Indian who entered the
reservation for "commercial activities." The Montana Court's emphasis on the
fact that the relationship has to be consensual, seems to indicate that the tribal
authority is derived from the "consent" of the non-Indians
and not from the
17
tribe's inherent authority over any commercial activity. 1
173. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810).
174. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). Although Justice Johnson may have believed that the Tribes did not have
jurisdiction over anyone else but their own members, he also believed that tribal members themselves
were not under the control of anyone else but their tribes. His views on this issue are clearly
summarized in his concurrent opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia where he stated "I believe in one
view and in one only, if at all, they are or may be deemed a state, though not a sovereign state....
[T]heir condition is something like that of the Israelites, when inhabiting the deserts. Though without
land that they can call theirs in the sense of property, their right of personal self-government has never
been taken from them .... And such they certainly possess; it has never been questioned, nor any
attempt made at subjugating them as a people, or restraining their personal liberty except as their land
and trade." 30 U.S. 1, 27 (1831).
175. See discussion infra Part II.B. at notes 30-32.

176. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
177. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (denied tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member
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The other cited cases never emphasized the "consensual" aspect of the
relationship. For instance, in Williams v. Lee, 178 the Court emphasized that the
crucial factor was that the transaction involved a "reservation affair." The Court
stated:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian.
He was on the reservation and the transaction with an
179
Indian took place there.
The Williams Court never described more specifically what constituted a
"reservation affair." However, the fact that a non-Indian was involved in the law
suit was not enough to make this transaction an "external" instead of a
"reservation" affair. More importantly, the consent of the non-Indian was totally
irrelevant, the Court made clear that to the extent that "consent" was needed, it
was implied from the fact that the non-Indian was on the reservation. Neither of
the other two cases cited by the Montana court to support its first exception,
Morris v. Hitchcock'8' and Buster v. Wright,181 restrict tribal authority to
"consensual" relations.
Having stated at the outset that Indian tribes have been divested of any
inherent power over non-Indians because this concerned external relations and
the powers of self-government only involve relations among members, Montana
attempted to reconcile some of the cases which had recognized the existence of
tribal jurisdiction by arbitrarily fitting them as belonging to one or the other
exception. Although the cases mentioned as supporting the second exception miss
the mark altogether in that they are cases attempting to ascertain the limit of state
and not tribal jurisdiction, the cases which are cited for the first exception do not
fit the bill either since they do not rely on "consent" as the benchmark to
recognize tribal power. Strate was able to exploit these faulty authorities used to
justify an exception to a non-existent general rule in order to introduce its notion
that what is necessary to tribal self-government should be determined by whether
state jurisdiction over the same activity would unduly trench on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
In the future, it appears tribal jurisdiction over non-members on nonmember lands will exist mostly in cases where Congress has enacted legislation.
The next section will discuss the limits if any, on the power of Congress to

Indians).

178. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
179. Id. at 223.
180. 194 U.S. 384 (1904). This case is somewhat unusual because it involved non-Indians suing the

Secretary of the Interior to enjoin him from enforcing the laws of Chickasaw Tribe which had enacted
legislation directing the United States to impound cattle grazing on their reservation by belonging to

non-Indians who had not paid a tribal tax. What makes this case unusual is that pursuant to treaties
and Acts of congress all laws enacted by the Chickasaw legislature had to be approved by the president

of the United States.
181. 135 F. 947, 950 (1905).
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preempt state jurisdiction over non-members for activities occurring on lands not
owned by the tribe, its members, or the federal government.
C.

Congressionalpower to pre-empt statejurisdictionover non-members located
on non-member lands within Indian reservations.

There are both some positive and negative aspect to the existence of
Congressional power within Indian reservations. On the positive side,
Congressional power has been used to pre-empt state jurisdiction within Indian
reservations.rn On the other hand, the Court has used the "plenary power"
183
concept to justify congressional intervention in the internal affairs of the tribes.
The question asked in this section is whether there are any limits on Congressional
power to pre-empt state authority within Indian reservations.
One line of argument is that the power of Congress over Indian affairs is not
in fact plenary. Under the doctrine of enumerated power, Congress can only act
pursuant to a power specifically delegated to it under the Constitution. 184 One of
the first cases addressing the issue of whether Congress instead of the states had
power over Indians within an Indian reservation was United States v. Kagama.8 5
Although the Kagama Court refused to invoke the Commerce Clause as a source
of congressional power over Indians, it used a mixture of inherent sovereignty
derived from the ownership of the country along with the existence of a trust
relationship between the tribes and the federal government not only to legitimize
congressional power over Indians but also to pre-empt the exercise of state power
within Indian reservations. 86 However, although the trust doctrine used to be
invoked as a source of extra constitutional power for Congress, the Court over the
years has backed away from using the trust as a source of "plenary" power
whenever constitutional rights of Indians may have been affected. 187 More
recently, the Court has not even mentioned the doctrine in cases such as Hodel v.
Irving,188 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida.89
Although Congressional authority over Indian affairs can be and has been
182. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), and discussion infra Part
I.C. at notes 54-58.
183. See Kagama v. United States, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
184. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). "We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal government of enumerated powers ...." Id. at 552. As James Madison
wrote "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The
Federalist No. 45, pp 292-293." Id.
185. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
186. Id. The Court in Kagama held that the Congress had the constitutional power to enact the
Major Crimes Act which authorized the federal government to prosecute Indians who commit any of
the listed crimes against other Indians while on Indian reservations.
187. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Delaware Tribal Business Committee v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). For an interesting article on how the trust doctrine could be used to curb
Congressional power over Indian tribes see Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in FederalIndian Law:
A Look at Its Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its
Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 115 (1997).
188. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
189. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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derived from various sources, 90 the judicial trend has been to rely exclusively on
the Indian commerce power. 91 While it is true that a long line of Supreme Court
precedents have asserted that this power gives Congress "plenary" authority over
Indian affairs vis a vis the tribes, 192 the Court in cases such as United States v.
Lopez,1 93 and United States v. Morrison,'94 has recently narrowed the scope of the
Commerce power and has indicated a new sensitivity to states' rights under the
Constitution. Although it would be reasonable to think that such thinking would
be extended to curb Congressional power over Indian tribes,9 the more realistic
probability is that the same reasoning may be applied to impose limits on
Congressional power to pre-empt state authority within Indian reservations. In
other words, is it possible that the same federalist sentiment which guided the
Court in cases such as Seminole Tribe v. Florida 6 Lopez, and Morrison, might
lead the Court to closely question Congress' authority under its Indian Commerce
power to pre-empt state jurisdiction? Professor Martha Field raised this
possibility when she stated in a recent article that:
A more ominous view is that the Seminole Court was building precedent for the
future, eliminating solicitous treatment for native Americans faced with the prospect
of increasing state regulations.... [U]nder this view, the Seminole decision cannot
be regarded as lacking significance for the role of native Americans vis-a-vis
federalism, for it is the first decision ever in which the Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional a congressional enactment concerning structural federal-stateIndian relationships. Moreover, even if the holding goes no further, the limitation
on congressional power that results directly from Seminole has potentially
far7
reaching effects on future congressional regulation of Indian affairs.1
It is true that previous cases challenging the power of Congress to regulate
non-members while on non Indian fee land located within Indian reservations
have upheld congressional power, but these cases involved liquor transactions
within Indian reservations which either clearly involved commerce or Indians

190. For a critical and comprehensive analysis as to the legitimacy of the plenary power, see Nell
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians; Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195

(1984).
191. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163 (1989). The treaty power has not been exercised with Indian nations since 1871 and Congress'
power to govern and managed federal territories is not applicable to regulate non-members on non

federal and non tribal land.
192. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The Court stated, "As the Court
in Talton v. Mayes, recognized, however, Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate

the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess."

Id. See also Cotton

Petroleum Inc. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).

193. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting Congress' power to regulate handguns within local
school zones where no impact on interstate commerce is demonstrated).

194. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
195. See Richard Garnett, Once More into the Maze, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal
Conspiracy Jurisdictionin Indian Country,72 N. D. L. Rev. 433 (1996).

196. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
197. The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. hJ. 3, 19-20
(1997). See also Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating FederalIndian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 49-51
(1996), and Ray Torgenson, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment of the
Federal TrustDoctrine in American Indian Law, 2 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 165, 189-190 (1996).
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directly.1 9 While it seems that traffic regulation of non-members on a state
highway running through the reservation, which was at issue in Strate, would have
a substantial impact on commerce with the Indian tribe, this is an area of the law
which is still developing.
Supporting congressional power, however, are
statements like the following made by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Floridav. Seminole Tribe:
If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power
from the States to the federal government than does the Interstate Commerce
Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some
authority over interstate trade but have
199 been divested of virtually all authority over

Indian commerce and Indian tribes.
This article takes the position that the very power to create Indian
reservations implies the right to pre-empt all state jurisdiction within them.
Although a state may have obtained the authority to regulate certain activities of
non-members within Indian reservations when Congress decided to allow lands to
be transferred out of Federal or Indian ownership,2 ° Congress still retained the
power to regulate and impose conditions on any non-member activities within
these reservations. Any possible misunderstandings about this comes from the
Court's less than ingenious statements purporting to justify Congress' "plenary"
power over Indian affairs and Indian tribes solely using the Commerce power.
This dilemma could be obviated if the Court followed up on one scholar's
observation and held that Congressional plenary power, vis-a-vis the states, does
not only come from the Commerce power, but from the structure of the
constitution. According to Professor Frickey, "If this argument is accepted, it
leaves the states completely out of the picture of Indian affairs--the authority
over Indian affairs is centralized and plenary, in the same sense that the power
over interstate commerce is .... "201
198. See e.g., Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478,482 (1914), and United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 555 (1974). See also United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, where the Court
confirmed federal authority to regulate liquor traffic with Indians even on lands ceded by the tribe and
now part of the state of Minnesota. Id. The Court took the position that it did not matter whether the
interactions took place off the reservation because these interactions still constituted "commerce" with
Indian tribes. Id.
199. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 62.
200. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) and see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
201. Philip Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 68-69 (1996).
Comparing the plenary power of Congress in Immigration and Indian Law, Professor Frickey observed
that the source of the power invoked by the Court in its 1889 decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 (1889), is in fact the same as the one invoked in its 1886 Kagama decision. Although it
can be argued that this Congressional power is not as much delegated as it is "inherent" to an
independent sovereign country under principles of international law, Professor Frickey observed that
the plenary power of Congress in these two areas could be viewed as derived from the structure of the
Constitution:
This structural argument proposes that inherent in the Constitution, not outside the
Constitution, are all those notions of inherent sovereignty under international law that are
not inconsistent with constitutional text, structures, or institutional relationships. In this
light, the abandonment of the ambiguous provision in the Articles of Confederation about
power over Indian Affairs and the language in the Constitution about treaty power, war
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In conclusion, even though the Indian Commerce power should not be
interpreted as giving Congress "plenary" authority to intervene in the internal
affairs of Indian tribes, it does give Congress the exclusive power to determine and
conduct relations with the Indian tribes vis-a-vis the states.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it would have been more doctrinally sound for the Court to adopt
the position that whenever Congress allows non-members to buy land inside
Indian reservations, it intends a divestiture of tribal powers over such nonmembers. The problem with this approach is that such Congressional intent is
absent and inherent sovereignty cannot legitimately be narrowed down to the
right to exclude.
There is nothing principled or doctrinally sound about the Court's
jurisprudence in federal Indian law; it all seems based on political expediency.
Tribal inherent sovereignty over tribal territory and the people who live there was
first recognized in treaties and confirmed by Justice Marshall, just as was the
concomitant principle that the states have no jurisdiction over tribal territory.
Being uncomfortable with these ideas, the Rhenquist Court has struggled to find
ways to divest tribes of such jurisdiction while at the same time increasing state
jurisdiction within Indian reservations.
In a previous article I asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Strate v.
A-1 Contractors had not changed the rules of the game as established in the
Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States.2° I have now reconsidered my
position. Although the Supreme Court has not yet held that tribes can never
exercise any inherent sovereign powers over non-members, the Court no longer
talks in terms of Indian sovereignty. Instead, the preferred terms are "right of
Tribal self-government," and "right to exclude." This article has suggested that
for at least some of the Justices, when it comes to tribal authority over nonmembers, self-government and the right to exclude are different than sovereignty
in that unlike "sovereignty" which is inherent, "self-government" and the "right to
exclude" seems to be rights which, in some fashion, have to be recognized,
reaffirmed, or conferred by the greater sovereign. Thus, there is some indications
that the Court will soon refuse to recognize inherent tribal sovereign powers over
non-members while on non-member lands without any indication that Congress
would somehow support such tribal authority.

power, and power over commerce with Indian tribes provide strong reason to conclude that
the colonial power resides in Congress not in the states ....
Id.
This "structural argument" theory has the benefit of allowing meaningful judicial review under

the Constitution, a possibility which may not be available if the power is truly inherent and extra
constitutional.

On the topic of Congressional power as emanating from the structure of the

Constitution, see also Charles Black, Structure andRelationship in ConstitutionalLaw 7 (1969).
202. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in FederalIndian Law and the Agencies' Duty

to Interpret Legislationin Favor of Indians:Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the "Tribes
as States" Section of the Clean Water Act," 11 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 15 (1998).
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Although the next round of legal battles will be about the kind of
congressional nod that is required before tribal jurisdiction over non-members can
be activated from its state of suspended animation, the tribes should not wait that
long. There are no reasons why the tribes and the states could not sit down at the
negotiating table, iron out their jurisdictional problems, and together approach
Congress for ratification of such agreements. This has been done before in many
water rights and land claims settlements.20 Perhaps these settlements involved
rare situations where both the tribes and the states had more to gain by sitting
down at the negotiating table than staying away from it. Congress, the tribes, and
the states should not give up, however, in attempting to formulate new and
improved mechanisms facilitating such trilateral agreements.

203. See., e.g., 25 U.S.C. 1701-1716 (1994) (codifying the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement
Act); 25 U.S.C. 1721-1735 (1994) (codifying the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980); Salt

River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100-512,
102 Stat. 2549 (1988).
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